Redefinition of Security Concept: The Value of Securitisation Theory

Pendefinisian Semula Konsep Sekuriti: Nilai Teori Sekuritisasi

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Abstract

The concept of security is generally associated with anything related to military issues, e.g., war and conflict. However, the rise of non-traditional security (hereinafter NTS) threats like terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and infectious diseases challenge the conventional security concept. The debate created a significant question of how to broaden the scope of security to encompass other non-military issues while avoiding losing its analytical value. Hence, the article focuses on the debate of re-conceptualising and widening the concept of security. Two possible outcomes of this debate are explored using the library method: securitisation theory and human security. Although human security is viewed as one of the solutions to the debate, it has been criticised for its lack of a meaningful concept, particularly in addressing NTS threats. It is in this contextual gap that securitisation theory has attempted to fill. However, the theory also comes with conceptual and methodological shortcomings. By offering an outline of the theory, this article highlights the value of the theory while noting that it requires further refinement.

Keywords: human security, non-traditional security (NTS), security, securitisation theory

Abstrak

Konsep keselamatan secara umumnya dikaitkan dengan apa sahaja yang berkaitan dengan isu ketenteraan; contoh peperangan dan konflik. Bagaimanapun, peningkatan ancaman keselamatan bukan tradisional (NTS) seperti terorisme, pembersihan etnik dan penyakit berjangkit mencabar konsep keselamatan konvensional. Perdebatan itu menimbulkan persoalan penting tentang cara meluaskan skop konsep keselamatan yang merangkumi isu bukan ketenteraan yang lain, di samping mengelak kehilangan nilai analitikalnya. Oleh itu, artikel ini memfokuskan kepada perdebatan mengkonsepsikan semula dan meluaskan konsep keselamatan. Dengan menggunakan kaedah perpustakaan, dua kemungkinan hasil perdebatan ini dikaji: teori sekuritisasi dan keselamatan insan. Walaupun keselamatan insan dilihat sebagai salah satu penyelesaian kepada perdebatan ini, ia telah dikritik kerana kekurangan konsep yang bermakna, terutamanya dalam menangani ancaman keselamatan bukan tradisional. Jurang konteks inilah yang cuba diisi oleh teori sekuritisasi. Walau bagaimanapun, teori ini juga datang dengan kelemahan konsep dan metodologi. Dengan menawarkan garis kasar teori, artikel ini menyerlahkan nilai teori ini disamping mengakui bahawa ia memerlukan pemurnian lanjut.

Kata kunci*: keselamatan insan, keselamatan, bukan tradisional, keselamatan, teori sekuritisasi*

INTRODUCTION

Security concept is an ambiguous term as it can be a goal, an issue area, a research programme, or a discipline (Haftendorn, 1991). The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *security* as "the state of being or feeling secure" and "the safety of a state or organization" (Waite and Hawker 2009, p. 836). In layman's terms, security describes the physical and psychological condition of feeling safe and secure from any dangers or threats. However, these definitions differ from the concept of security used by the international relations (IR) theorists and experts when referring to national security or security policies, as they offer more detailed explanations of the term. The end of the Cold War saw the rise of a new era of security issues that challenged the term security synonymously associated with military issues. This situation raised the question of whether all issues can be recognised as security issues.

Thus, using the library method, analysing academic material predominantly from IR literature on security concept, this study aims to discuss the evolution of the security concept by focusing on the debate between the traditional security groups and the scholars of NTS threats. This article consists of three sections. The first introduces the debate on re-conceptualising and widening the concept of security. The debate created a significant question on how to broaden the scope of security to encompass other NTS issues while avoiding losing its analytical value. The second section examines the two possible outcome of this debate; human security and securitisation theory. Human security is viewed as one of the solutions to the debate but a broad vision of this concept is seen as nothing more than a shopping list. This debate succeeded in producing a framework known as securitisation theory Securitisation theory is expected to expand the scope of the security field while preventing it from losing its analytical value. The final section highlights the value of the securitisation theory while noting it requires further refinement.

Redefinition of Security Concept

Since the outbreak of the Second World War, security studies are synonymous with the issue of war and peace. Especially in the midst of the Cold War era, the definition of security was straightforward: anything that involved war and military forces and the state as the only actor in the international system. The security studies literature fits comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm. There are three main assumptions made by realists. First, the international systems are in a state of anarchy – there is no international authority that can enforce the agreement and prevent the use of force. Second, the state is the main actor within the international system. Third, power is the defining feature in the international environment. As the state is the primary referent of security policy, the realists argued that the main responsibility of the state is to protect its citizens against internal and external threats. Hence, a state would use any means, including force, to protect their interests, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, as power and stability are the decisive determinant factors for a state to achieve security (Mearsheimer, 1995; Keohane, 1986).

Clearly, this security model is determined by placing military issues as the central focus. Low-level political issues such as health, welfare, and environment are viewed as issues of domestic politics and need to be kept separate from the high politics of state security (Hough, 2008). However, in the years leading up to the end of the Cold War, the restricted paradigm of the security concept no longer sufficiently addressed the phenomenon in the contemporary world. These assumptions about security have been questioned by the group known as the wideners ever since the traditionalist analysts' failure to anticipate the end of the Cold War and the emerging threat posed by NTS problems.

The urgent need to challenge the conventional view of security ushered in another school of thought, the so-called wideners, to widen the security studies agenda. On the one hand, with the rise of NTS threats in the late 1980s, the widener scholars such as Buzan (1991), Ullman (1983), and Mathews (1989) believed that the concept of security should not be restricted to the military realm only. It should instead incorporate other issues, such as the economic, social, and political. These are all the causes and effects of security. On the other hand, the deepeners believed that the security agenda should not be

restricted to solely focus on the state but also opened out to include other security referents, such as individuals, communities, and social groups. For instance, Barry Buzan (1946–), a leading scholar among the wideners, pointed out in his seminal book, *People, States and Fear* (1991), that security should not be limited to the military discourse as people are also affected by threats in different areas. He also maintained that besides states, other actors in the international system also play significant roles (Buzan, 1991). For the wideners, the damaging impacts of these threats on states are no less than the effects on military power. The main aim of the wideners is to extend the range of knowledge and understanding of the concept of security studies.

The traditionalist scholars, likewise, contend against the overuse of the term security. Walt (1991) raised his concern at the wideners' attempts to broaden the notion of security, as the useful prioritisation function of security studies could be lost if everything is regarded as an urgent matter of security. For him, security studies are still about the phenomenon of war. Hence, proposals, including other non-military issues, risk the logic of security studies. If all issues, such as pollution, disease or economic recessions, are regarded as security issues, it would destroy intellectual coherence and thus make it more challenging to devise solutions. Moreover, the emergence of other threats does not mean that the threat of war is eradicated. Walt asserted that although "other hazards exist, [this] does not mean that the danger of war has been eliminated" (Walt, 1991, p. 213). Thus, any attempt to ignore or eliminate the role of military forces in security studies is deemed irresponsible. For the traditionalists, widening the security agenda is risky as it can make both scholarship and state policy incoherent. Putting too much effort into widening the security agenda will risk the essential meaning of security becoming void.

The wideners' idea to position everything as a security issue has also been refuted by scholars exploring the non-military dimensions of security. Although the word *security* presently attracts heightened political attention, the ability could be diminished if we overuse or abuse the concept. Deudney (1990) raised an example of this in favour of expanding the meaning of security on the environmental issue. In his words, "If everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a 'security threat', the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym for 'bad'" (Deudney, 1990, pp. 463–464). Similarly, Selgelid and Enemark (2008) voiced their concern about characterising HIV/AIDS as a security threat. Such an effort may put too much strain on the concept of security: if the term security is used too loosely, it will lose its meaning and no longer be able to play a useful role in political discourse (Selgelid & Enemark, 2008). Huysmans (1998), likewise, concerned that the notion of security would become a trivial concept when the difference between security and non-security problems cannot be deliberately established. Wæver (1995), one of the leading scholars of widening the agenda, also concerned with the attempt to widen security issues. He believed that, "...addressing an issue in security terms will allocate the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement" (p. 47).

Nonetheless, the traditional conception of defining the notion of security, wherein the security concept should stay in the realm of military issues, does not mean that the NTS threats do not exist nor that they have no impact on the world or the community. Indeed, the traditional definition of security is widely criticised by other academics as it neglects to recognise the whole situation of the real world when the emerging threats posed by non-military issues like territory conflicts and resource scarcity have the same impact as military issues (Ullman, 1983).

In this sense, the traditionalists failed to define security based on the contemporary world. At the same time, the wideners' objective of treating security as a catch-all concept resulted in losing the intellectual coherence of the security concept. In this context, the question focuses on how to broaden the scope of security to encompass non-military issues while avoiding a loss in its analytical value. However, none of these assumptions effectively represents the reality of the contemporary security agenda. One way to settle this debate is through the concept of human security (Newman, 2001).

Human Security

Human security is based on the intertwined concepts of freedom from want - community, economic, food, health, personal, and political securities - and freedom from fear. Human security literature can be traced back to 1994 when the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published a Human Development Report. This report consisted of seven dimensions: namely, food, economic, political, health, personal, community, and environmental. In the report, *human security* was defined as the security of people enjoying freedom from want amid threats posed by the seven dimensions and freedom from fear - associated with the state-centric perspectives of the realists, such as freedom from authoritarian states (Paris, 2001; Nishikawa, 2010). This, in turn, seems parallel to the agenda of broadening the discourse within the academic study of security. The UN's concept of human security concerns quality of life rather than emphasising weapons and defence. Human security emphasises the security of individuals before the state. Hence, scholars studying NTS threats like poverty, malnutrition, disease, or environmental degradation use the human security approach in an attempt to encourage the state to give more attention and resources to the NTS threats from the perspective of the security of the people (James, 2013; Karyotis, 2012; Yuk-Ping & Thomas, 2010).

The idea of human security seems plausible as it attempts to address the gap that the traditionalists and the wideners failed to fill. Paris (2001) offered a positive review of the practicality of applying the human security concept in security studies. Using a matrix, shown in Figure 1.1, he portrayed security studies as a four-cell matrix with human security occupying one of these cells. Paris claimed that such an avenue would contribute to IR and security studies, as the idea of human security may serve,

> "as a label for a broad category of research in the field of security studies that is primarily concerned with non-military threats to the safety of societies, groups, and individuals, in contrast to more traditional approaches to security studies that focus on protecting states from external threats" (Paris, 2001p. 96).

Figure 1.1
Matrix of Security Studies

What is the Source of the Security Threat?

Security for Whom?	Military	Military, Non-military, or Both
State	Cell 1 National Security Conventional realist approach to security studies	Cell 2 Redefined security e.g. environmental and economic security
Societies, Groups, and Individual	Cell 3 Intrastate security (e.g. civil war, ethnic conflict, and genocide)	Cell 4 Human Security (e.g. environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)

However, despite such contributions, human security does not escape criticism, whether of their conceptual framework or their analytical weaknesses (Newman, 2010; Thomas & Tow, 2002). The first negative effect broadens the concept of security to encompass anything that threatens the security of the people, like unemployment or homelessness. Khong (2001) argued that such efforts to prioritise everything will end up prioritising nothing. Krause (2004) opined that "a broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list", and this might cause the approach to become a loose

synonym for "bad things that can happen" (p. 40). Indeed, the term would become meaningless if everything is regarded as a security issue, which could confuse scholars and policymakers. Second, and more important, it is not clear that anything is gained by linking human security to issues such as education, fair trade practices, and public health (Krause, 2004). In other words, a more narrowly defined concept of human security is needed to achieve greater analytical and policy value, which could differentiate this concept from the traditional security elements (Thomas & Tow, 2002). Based on these arguments, the research turned to other approaches to study the NTS threats.

While the wideners believed that the inclusion of other issues as a security threat could enhance the analytical value of the security concept, the traditionalists argued that this move would only make the term lose its meaning. They also emphasised the need to focus on the military issues in order to preserve the value of the notion of security. The debate has left a huge gap in defining the security concept in terms of broadening the scope of the term in encompassing non-military issues while maintaining its analytical value. Meanwhile, the broad definition of the human security approach might cause vagueness when applying the approach within a sophisticated conceptual and analytical framework. The Copenhagen School of Securitisation Theory offered an alternative answer to the debate on broadening the security agenda without losing its analytical value. This school of thought filled the gap in the debate between the traditionalists, the wideners, and the human security scholars as they chose a middle position in the debate.

The Copenhagen School of Securitisation Theory

Securitisation theory is a constructivist-based theory, which originated from the Copenhagen School of Thought. The securitisation concept first entered the IR arena through Wæver (1995) before he cooperated with Buzan and de Wilde to fully polish the framework (Buzan et al., 1998). In one of the most notable writings offered by this school, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), these three scholars argued that security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society) (Buzan et al., 1998). Based on this definition, the school maintained the security-survival-logic found in a traditional understanding of security. Nevertheless, they broadened the concept of security by extending it beyond military security into four other categories: environmental, economic, societal, and political. At the same time, the school refuted the idea that everything is security. They argued that labelling an issue as security takes it beyond the realm of normal political discourse and allows exceptional actions to be undertaken (Buzan et al., 1998). Given that context, the school developed an analytical framework to study security known as the securitisation and desecuritisation model in order to overcome the vagueness of identifying security issues.

Instead of accepting the traditionalists' view that the domain of security issue is still in the military sector and proposing a universal list of definitions of security concepts offered by the wideners, the Copenhagen School provided security tools for analysing many different types of threat by focusing on how particular developments or issues are discursively constructed as a security threat. The theory explores the logic of security to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitisation, which is merely political (Buzan, 1999). The securitisation theory provides a better view of recognising a normal politics moving into a realm of unusual emergency politics. Most importantly, the securitisation theory answers the question of how to determine an issue as a security threat without losing its analytical value, as it requires a securitisation formula, namely the speech act, target audience, and others to legitimise their actions. The idea of securitisation theory draws heavily on the theory of language, specifically from the branch known as speech act theory. Through the theory of language, we can regard security as a speech act. Wæver (1995, p.35) indicated that the speech acts are, in theory, illocutionary in nature. "Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it [security] something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). . In other words, labelling something as a security issue turns it into such, although this does not necessarily mean that a real threat is present

The meaning of security is constructed when the securitising actor state, as the particular referent object, is threatened in its existence. The actor then claims the issue is an absolute priority on the government agenda and invokes an emergency measure to ensure the referent object's survival. This moved the issue from normal politics to the realm of emerging politics. In other words, when someone utters that 'X' is a threat to the government's survival, then it becomes securitised, as it becomes the government priority whereby the government will take immediate action. This does not mean that everyone can be a securitiser, as they need to meet certain conditions; the words have to be said by someone in authority, in the right context, and according to certain pre-established rituals or conventions (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

Meeting these conditions does not guarantee that an issue will become securitised. The critical condition for a successful securitisation process also requires the audience to be persuaded. In this context, a complete securitisation process will not occur even after the securitising actor has presented something as an existential threat. At this stage, for an issue to be regarded as a security issue, the audience must accept the actor's interpretation of events and recognise that extraordinary measures must be implemented. In other words, the issue is only securitised if the audience accepts it as such. If the securitising actor fails to convince the audience via the speech act, the act is merely a securitising move. In other words, gaining audience acceptance is a crucial move towards securitisation. At the same time, the role of the audience has prevented the securitising actors to abuse their power, as the securitisation process is largely determined by the audience (Buzan et al., 1998).

Buzan et al. (1998) referred to it as a two-stage process. In the first stage, to ensure that an issue is addressed as a security issue, an actor has to make the issue into an existential threat. However, it does not automatically mean it has become a security issue. This step is known as the securitising move, but to ensure the issue is securitised, the audience should accept the move made by the securitising actor. Thus, in the second stage, for an issue to be regarded as a security issue, the audience has to accept the interpretation of events by the actor and recognise that extraordinary measures must be implemented. This stage not only revealed how an issue becomes a security issue, but it also examines which actors initiate the securitising move and the need for the audience to accept the interpretation.

Security is not an objective condition but the outcome of specific social processes. For any threat to become represented and recognised, it needs to be analysed by examining the securitising speech act. As Wæver (1995, p. 55) argued, "we can regard security as a speech act…the utterance itself is the act…by saying the word, something is done". In this context, the concept of security can be best defined as a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue - not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998). Moreover, securitisation is an "essentially inter-subjective process" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 30). Although the securitising actor managed to present such an existential threat, without the acceptance of the relevant audience, the threat could not be securitised. Only through an audience's consent can such move precede, which will put a normal political issue into a realm of emergency political agenda. This highlights the importance of inter-subjectivity in determining the success of such a process.

Based on the above discussion, the Copenhagen School provided the best answer in broadening the concept of security without losing its analytical value. Both traditional and NTS issues can be incorporated into the security concept through the significant criterion in the Copenhagen School - an issue is defined by the inter-subjective establishment between securitising actor and audience of an existential threat, which legitimates actors to deal with that threat using extraordinary means.

The Value of Securitisation/Security

Securitisation theory has two main contributions. First, it stresses the responsibility of securitising actors in facing the securitise issue (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Second, it serves as an early warning to the referent object (Lo, 2012). In other words, based on Waever's argument, securitisation mechanism supports the explicitness behind the logic of securitising move, as the securitising actors need to clarify

their reasons for securitising one issue over others. Therefore, it can avoid misuse of power among the practitioners (Wæver, 1999). Because of that, the securitisation theory has become the most widely applied theoretical framework by analysts for non-traditional security issues (Jones, 2011), such as issues on religion (Fox & Akbaba, 2013), transnational crime (Laki, 2006; Emmers, 2003), and drug trafficking (Crick, 2012).

Although the securitisation theory is distinguished as one of the most vibrant areas of research in contemporary security studies, scholarly debates on it are broadly focused on the positive/negative debate of the security/securitisation theory. The Copenhagen School viewed security as inherently negative and usually best avoided (Aradau, 2004; Buzan et al., 1998). Aradau (2004) describes securitisation's production of us and them categories as something inherently negative, as there will always be winners – the security-haves – and there will always be losers – the security have-nots (Aradau, 2008). Even Wæver (2011), the pioneer scholar of the Copenhagen School, warned about the unavoidable negative effects of securitisation whenever the theory is used, including the logic of necessity, the narrowing of choice, and the empowerment of smaller elite. They view the realm of security as opposed to normal politics. What's more, based on these assumptions, they argued that in most cases "security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29).

Nevertheless, not all scholars agreed with the claim. Rejecting securitisation's Schmittian inheritance on the extraordinary politics constituted in the Copenhagen School. Booth's understanding of security as emancipation can be read direct to counter such characteristics of securitisation (security) - state-centric, military centric, and zero-sum (Booth, 2007). In fact, he instead suggested alternative renderings to the negative perception on securitisation;

> Such a static view of the [securitisation] concept is all the odder because security as a speech act has historically also embraced positive, non-militarised, and non-statist connotations … Securitisation studies, like mainstream strategic studies, remains somewhat stuck in Cold War mindsets. (Booth, 2007, p. 165)

Booth further argued that, therefore, securitisation has the potential to resist an expectation of hostility where in positive terms, it is able to embrace the potential for human equality, which Aradau postulated (Booth, 2007). Other authors, however, suggest an alternative to overcome this debate by focusing on studying the value of security/securitisation in a context. Context, although mentioned by the key authors in the debate, rarely elaborated upon or taken to its logical conclusions. Rita Floyd (2007) for example, the pioneer of the alternative approach to evaluate securitisation, argued that securitisation is neither priori positive nor negative; rather, it is issue-dependent. Floyd (2010) opposed the narrow perception that the outcome of such securitisation measures will only end up with conflicts or security dilemmas, as the securitisation scholars like Wæver (1995) claimed. Instead, Floyd, which in her later work defined negative security as morally wrong and morally prohibited, and positive security as morally right and morally permissible, suggested that "securitisations are not categorically morally wrong, but rather that, depending on the beneficiary of environmental security policies, securitisation can be morally permissible" (Floyd, 2010, p. 4). Thus, she suggested that we focus on the consequences or the outcome of securitisation in judging securitisation. Thus, utilising consequentialist ethics, Floyd posited that security outcomes would inevitably serve the interests of some rather than others. In fact, Floyd believed that security for the many rather than the few – is generally indicative of positive securitisation (Floyd, 2007). Here, she gave an example of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014 where she claimed that securitisation in this case is morally required as the harm of failing to securitise the issue is greater than the securitisation outcome (Floyd, 2016).

As she focused on the consequences or the outcomes of securitisation in judging securitisation, she argued that "securitisation has no intrinsic value; what matters are the consequences of securitisation alone" (Floyd, 2010, p. 7). In this way, securitisations are judged on their consequences. Therefore, inspired by just war tradition, Floyd proposed a rendition of securitisation theory by introducing Just Securitisation Theory (JST) (Floyd, 2014; 2011). JST differentiates between morally permissible and

prohibited securitisations only. In other words, it is concerned with what securitising actors are permitted to do, not with what they are morally required to do. Therefore, Floyd (2011) introduced a set of criteria that can determine the moral rightness of securitisation akin to the Copenhagen School's criteria that can determine the existence of securitisation and its success. Unlike the majority of the securitisation scholars, led by Wæver, who object to securitisation and advocate desecuritisation as the preferred long-term option on normative grounds, Floyd believed that just like securitisation, desecuritisation itself is not automatically justified, but needs to fulfil a set of criteria to be just (Floyd, 2016). Hence, Floyd stressed the revision of the securitisation theory is necessary in order to examine the moral rightness of securitisation as securitisation is not necessarily bad, as it depends on the context. In order to do so, the analysts must: 1) establish whether existential threats are objectively present; 2) examine both the intentions of aggressors and those of securitising actors; and 3) identify universal values that determine the referent object's moral legitimacy. In fact, Floyd proposed two issues to avoid securitisation from causing direct harm by justifying the securitisation itself: when to request security and how to request security, since securitisation is very much concerned with security speech (Floyd, 2018).

Other scholars agreed on the importance of context in determining the outcome of securitisation. They also supported the idea that security/securitisation is not inherently bad as the consequences of such a move depends on the context. Roe's "Gender and 'positive' security" (2014) discussed gender and feminist approaches to emphasise different context in determining security. Meanwhile, Gjørv (2012) who linked context, practices, and values in the positive/negative debate, demanded for a multi-actor and practice-oriented security framework. Through the multi-actor security approach, he emphasised that the role of actors is key to determining the result of securitisation as it allows us to observe and assess what practices between actors appear to succeed in given contexts and what processes fail. Meanwhile, Nyman (2016) highlighted the need for detailed empirical enquiry to see how different actors use security in different contexts and how individuals experience it, asking what different security practices do, what actions and habits they produce, and how they affect life experiences. In other words, in order to understand the value of security, we need to study how it works and what it does in different empirical contexts.

The securitisation theory has offered an innovative and original view from a broad spectrum of security issue. It provided a service to widen security concept by exploring what happens when the securitising actor labels particular threats as a security issue. As more security is usually considered good, as it can legitimise and justify policy choices. Hence, securitisation theory it seems answered the debate in broadening the concept of security while avoiding the analytical value. However, the theory is not without theoretical shortcomings. Scholar like Gjørv (2012) view negative security as an absence or lack of threats and it often associated with traditional militarised and stat-centred security. A key point of academic contention is whether security should be framed as a positive or a negative value. In some academic circles, 'security should be seen as negative, a failure to deal with issues of normal politics' (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 29) since it will only bring more particular emergency politics. . Nevertheless, avoiding securitisation neglects the potential of the theory. Therefore, if we are trying to understand security by studying how security is used, we cannot justifiably ignore alternative voices. It is important to study different empirical contexts to see how different actors use it and how individuals experience it in order to understand security practices (Nyman 2016).

CONCLUSION

Security is a contested concept in IR. During the Cold War era, the national security focused more on high political issues, leaving low-level political issues like migration, environmental challenges, and welfare with less attention. At the end of the Cold War, these low-level political issues kept threatening the international system. This situation challenged the conventional concept of security. Hence, it opened a channel for debate in redefining the concept of security. For the traditionalists, the concept of security should revolve on anything related to the military, but the wideners believed that the restricted

perspective no longer sufficiently addressed the phenomenon in the contemporary world. Nonetheless, the traditionalists' view on the security concept failed to acknowledge non-military threats. Meanwhile, the wideners' perspective of security as a catch-all concept resulted in losing the intellectual coherence of the security concept. In this sense, human security and the securitisation theory are trying to fill the gap. Despite the human security effort to fill the gap, the framework is criticised as too broad and needs to be refined to achieve greater analytical value. In this context, the securitisation theory offered an alternative answer in the debate on broadening the security agenda without losing its analytical value.

The securitisation scholars argued that if an issue is successfully securitised, it moves from the realm of normal politics to the realm of emergency politics, where exceptional measures are legitimised and issues are treated differently using "threat, defence, and often state-centred solutions" (Wæver, 1995, p. 59). In this context, the security dynamic has provided the securitising actors with means to legitimise their actions in attracting attention and extra resources to issues that may otherwise be overlooked. Hence, this approach has become particularly influential in addressing NTS threats as a security issue, it offers a solution on how to answer questions on determining a normal political issue as a security threat without losing its analytical value. By moving NTS issues higher up on either international or national agenda, it legitimizes the urgent moves needed to address the threats. Securitising NTS issues provides incentives for government policy-makers to devote greater attention and resources to an issue that may otherwise overlooked. However, with such positive moves, come some potentially negative consequences. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998) are concerned about choosing securitisation as the solution of widening the security agenda as this action carries its own hazards. Basically, 'security should be seen as negative, a failure to deal with issues of normal politics' (Ibid, 29) since it will only bring more emergency politics which are not necessarily positive and unproductive and sometimes can be manipulated for a political purpose. However, this does not means that we should neglect securitisation theory. There is much potential for other research on the value of security in different contexts. Hence, we cannot justifiably ignore alternative voices if we are trying to understand security by studying how security is used.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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